In a world where voters not only rank the alternatives but also qualify them as “approved” or “disapproved”, we observe that majoritarianism in preferences and majoritarianism in approvals are logically incompatible. We show that this observation generalises to the following result: every aggregation rule that respects unanimity and decomposes the aggregation of preferences and approvals is dictatorial. Our result implies an incompatibility between ordinal and evaluative approaches to social choice theory under 2 weak assumptions: respect for unanimity and independence of evaluation of each alternative. We describe possibilities when the latter assumption is relaxed. On the other hand, our impossibility generalises to the case where there are more than the two evaluative levels of “approved” and “disapproved”.

在当今世界中，选民不仅对替代方案进行排名，而且将其视为“已批准”或“被拒绝”，我们发现，在选举中优先的多数派主义与在批准中的多数派主义在逻辑上是不相容的。我们表明，这种观察可归纳为以下结果：每个尊重一致并分解偏好和认可的聚合的汇总规则都是独裁的。我们的结果表明，在2个弱假设下，社会选择理论的序数方法和评估方法之间是不兼容的：尊重一致性和每种选择的评估独立性。我们描述了后一种假设放宽时的可能性。另一方面，我们的可能性不可能概括为“批准”和“不批准”两个评估水平以上的情况。