Innovation contests have been an important tool used in product research and development for companies. In the innovation contest literature, most papers assume the homogenous innovation contest model or the all-pay auction model. In this paper, we consider the random trial contest model and study the optimal award scheme. We show that, in this contest model, risk types of contestants play important roles in the award scheme, and the results are independent of the probability density function of the random shock. These generalize the work in literature. In addition, the risk aversion coefficient will decide the allocation manner in a multiple-winner scheme, i.e., a concave allocation manner or a convex allocation manner is optimal.

创新竞赛已成为公司产品研发中使用的重要工具。在创新竞赛文献中，大多数论文都采用同质创新竞赛模型或全薪拍卖模型。在本文中，我们考虑了随机试验竞赛模型并研究了最佳奖励方案。我们证明，在这种竞赛模型中，竞赛者的风险类型在奖励计划中起着重要作用，其结果与随机冲击的概率密度函数无关。这些概括了文学作品。另外，风险规避系数将决定多赢者方案的分配方式，即凹分配方式或凸分配方式是最佳的。