For centuries, irrigation communities in south-eastern Spain were socially stable and economically efficient. In this article, we show how these self-governing institutions persisted by resolving conflicts over scarce resources with flexible punishment for water theft. We argue that variable penalties for violating irrigation rules provided social insurance to farmers during droughts. We develop a dynamic model in which judges trade off crime deterrence and social insurance, and test its predictions using a novel dataset on water theft in the self-governed irrigation community of Mula, Spain, from 1851 to 1948. For the same offence, we show that recidivists were punished more harshly than first-time offenders. When the defendant was wealthy, as indicated by the honorific title don, or the victim was poor, judgements were stricter.

中文翻译：

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偷水作为社会保险：西班牙东南部，1851-1948†

几个世纪以来，西班牙东南部的灌溉社区社会稳定，经济高效。在本文中，我们展示了这些自治机构如何通过灵活地惩罚偷水来解决稀缺资源的冲突，从而坚持下去。我们认为，对违反灌溉规则的可变处罚为农民在干旱期间提供了社会保险。我们开发了一个动态模型，在该模型中，法官会权衡犯罪威慑和社会保险，并使用 1851 年至 1948 年西班牙穆拉自治灌溉社区盗水的新数据集测试其预测。对于同样的罪行，我们表明惯犯比初犯受到更严厉的惩罚。当被告富有时，如尊称唐所示，或者被害人很穷，判断就更严格了。