A view of prominence in the philosophy of emotion is that emotional experiences are not self-standing intentional experiences. Instead, they inherit the intentional content they have from their cognitive bases. One implication is that emotions, whose intentional contents differ in terms of the modal and temporal properties of the relevant particular object—because the intentional contents on which they are based differ in these respects—nonetheless need not differ qua emotion-type. This leads to the same-emotional attitude, different content claim: It is possible to have the same emotional attitude toward a range of (different) contents, as provided by different cognitive bases. This paper argues that this claim is mistaken. By appealing to the specific case of imagination, the same emotional-attitude, different content claim is challenged. Drawing on phenomenological observations made by Jean-Paul Sartre, supplemented with independently plausible considerations, I argue that we should recognize a distinct class of emotion types, which I call affective imaginings. Affective imaginings contrast with emotional experiences whose cognitive bases are sense-perceptual experiences (affective perceptions). The contrast turns on the way the different contents across these cases modify the attitudinal character of the emotional experience, motivating the positing of two irreducible classes of emotional experiences.

中文翻译：

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两种不可简化的情感体验：情感想象和情感知觉

情感哲学中的一个突出观点是，情感体验不是独立的有意体验。相反，他们从他们的认知基础中继承了他们有意识的内容。一个暗示是，情感，其意向内容在相关特定对象的模态和时间属性方面有所不同——因为它们所基于的意向内容在这些方面有所不同——但作为情感类型并不需要不同。这导致了相同的情绪态度，不同的内容声称：对于不同认知基础所提供的一系列（不同）内容，可能具有相同的情绪态度。本文认为这种说法是错误的。通过诉诸想象的具体案例，相同的情感态度、不同的内容主张受到挑战。借鉴让-保罗·萨特的现象学观察，并辅以独​​立合理的考虑，我认为我们应该认识到一类不同的情感类型，我称之为情感想象。情感想象与情感体验形成对比，情感体验的认知基础是感官知觉体验（情感知觉）。对比开启了这些案例中不同内容改变情感体验的态度特征的方式，激发了两种不可简化的情感体验类别的假设。情感想象与情感体验形成对比，情感体验的认知基础是感官知觉体验（情感知觉）。对比开启了这些案例中不同内容改变情感体验的态度特征的方式，激发了两种不可简化的情感体验类别的假设。情感想象与情感体验形成对比，情感体验的认知基础是感官知觉体验（情感知觉）。对比开启了这些案例中不同内容改变情感体验的态度特征的方式，激发了两种不可简化的情感体验类别的假设。