In this paper, I develop a dynamic version of the efficient bargaining model grounded on optimal control in which a firm and a union bargain over the wage in a continuous-time environment under the supervision of an infinitely lived mediator. Overturning the findings achieved by means of a companion right-to-manage framework, I demonstrate that when employment is assumed to adjust itself with some attrition in the direction of the contract curve implied by the preferences of the two bargainers, increases in the bargaining power of the firm (union) accelerate (delay) the speed of convergence towards the stationary solution. In addition, confirming the reversal of the results obtained when employment moves over time towards the firm’s labour demand, I show that the dynamic negotiation of wages tends to penalize unionized workers and favour the firm with respect to the bargaining outcomes retrieved with a similar static wage-setting model.

在本文中，我开发了一个基于最优控制的动态讨价还价模型的动态版本，该模型中，企业和工会在无限生存的调解员的监督下，在连续时间的环境中就工资进行讨价还价。我推翻了通过相伴的管理权框架所取得的结论，我证明了当假定雇用者在两个谈判者的偏好所隐含的合同曲线方向上以一定程度的减员来进行自我调整时，议价能力会提高。企业（联盟）的速度加快（延迟）向固定解的收敛速度。此外，确认当就业随着时间推移朝公司的劳动力需求转移时所获得的结果是可逆的，