ABSTRACT

The aim of this article is to set the scene for the following special issue, which contains four papers relating to research on parliamentary scrutiny of the quality of legislation in different jurisdictions. In Continental Europe, Parliaments (although in a rather different range: more in countries such as Italy and Spain, less in countries such as Germany) have developed a more-in-depth approach in scrutinising the quality of legislation, i.e. a set of tools, standards and bodies to scrutinise it downstream, than that of Westminster jurisdictions. In the latter, a high-standard quality of legislation is guaranteed upstream by having bills drafted by Parliamentary Counsel, although in the United Kingdom there is currently a debate concerning the opportunity to strengthen parliamentary scrutiny of the quality of legislation. The hypotheses of this research were that the aforementioned models of parliamentary scrutiny are differently shaped in those jurisdictions due to the drafting model and the form of government established there. Against this background, the United States Congress is a very different animal: due to the peculiarities of the legislative process in the presidential system, the scrutiny in Congress relies on multiple parties. The reason why articles have been commissioned here is to test now on a larger scale the aforementioned hypotheses, which have already been partially proved in a previous article mainly concerning Italy (E. Albanesi, ‘Parliamentary Scrutiny of the Quality of Legislation within Europe’ (2021) Statute Law Review). This time the analysis will focus on two Continental European parliamentary systems (Spain and Germany), one jurisdiction belonging to the Parliamentary Counsel/Westminster model (Canada) and one presidential system (the U.S.). The articles published here seem to support on a larger scale the aforementioned hypotheses. The article on Canada also helps reflect upon the opportunity to strengthen parliamentary scrutiny of the quality of legislation in Westminster jurisdictions.

摘要

本文的目的是为下一期特刊打下基础，其中包括四篇与议会审查不同司法管辖区的立法质量有关的论文。在欧洲大陆，议会（尽管范围很不相同：意大利和西班牙等国家的议会更多，德国等国家的议会更少）已经在审查立法质量方面采用了更深入的方法，即一套工具，审查其下游的标准和机构，而不是威斯敏斯特（Westminster）辖区的标准和机构。在后者中，由议会法律顾问起草法案确保了上游高质量的立法质量，尽管目前在英国，关于是否有机会加强议会对立法质量的审查的辩论仍在进行。这项研究的假设是，由于起草模型和那里建立的政府形式，前述的议会审查模式在那些辖区中的形成方式有所不同。在这种背景下，美国国会是一种截然不同的动物：由于总统制中立法程序的特殊性，国会的审查取决于多个政党。之所以在这里委托文章，是为了现在更大规模地检验上述假设，在先前有关意大利的文章中已经部分证明了这一假设（E. Albanesi，“欧洲内部立法质量的议会审查”（ 2021年）美国国会是一种截然不同的动物：由于总统制中立法程序的特殊性，国会的审查取决于多方政党。之所以在这里委托文章，是为了现在更大规模地检验上述假设，在先前有关意大利的文章中已经部分证明了这一假设（E. Albanesi，“欧洲内部立法质量的议会审查”（ 2021年）美国国会是一种截然不同的动物：由于总统制中立法程序的特殊性，国会的审查取决于多方政党。之所以在这里委托文章，是为了现在更大规模地检验上述假设，在先前有关意大利的文章中已经部分证明了这一假设（E. Albanesi，“欧洲内部立法质量的议会审查”（ 2021年）法规法审查）。这次的分析将集中在两个欧洲大陆议会体系（西班牙和德国）上，一个管辖区属于议会顾问/威斯敏斯特模式（加拿大），另一个是总统制（美国）。这里发表的文章似乎在很大程度上支持了上述假设。关于加拿大的文章还有助于反思机会，以加强议会对威斯敏斯特司法管辖区立法质量的审查。