In this study we examine how the regulation of director attendance disciplines directors’ behavior, and consider the governance effect of such regulations. This examination exploits the differences between the requirements for director attendance at board meetings enacted by the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE). Using a difference-in-differences model with a sample of A-share listed firms from 2006 to 2017, we document that the rate of meeting attendance by independent directors who serve with firms listed on the SHSE (SHIDs) has increased significantly since the exchange’s enforcement of the regulation on attendance. This positive effect has been more pronounced for independent directors with legal backgrounds. Further investigations find that the regulation of attendance plays a corporate governance role through the mechanism of enhanced monitoring. The attendance regulation increases the SHIDs likelihood of casting dissenting votes, and it leads to both better accounting performance and higher firm value. In addition, SHIDs are more likely to depart from firms listed on the SHSE, and to transfer their directorships to firms listed on the SZSE, which has a less constraining attendance requirement. Our findings provide evidence of how external regulation shapes director attendance and voting behavior in emerging markets.

在这项研究中，我们研究了董事出勤规范如何约束董事的行为，并考虑了此类规范的治理效果。该考试利用了上海证券交易所（SHSE）和深圳证券交易所（SZSE）制定的董事出席董事会会议的要求之间的差异。我们使用差异模型对2006年至2017年间A股上市公司进行抽样调查，结果表明自交易所上市以来，与在上海证券交易所（SHID）上市的公司服务的独立董事的出席率有了显着提高。出勤规定的执行。对于具有法律背景的独立董事而言，这种积极影响更为明显。进一步的调查发现，通过加强监控机制，出勤管理起了公司治理的作用。出勤规定增加了SHIDs投反对票的可能性，并导致更好的会计业绩和更高的公司价值。此外，SHIDs更有可能离开在SHSE上市的公司，并将其董事职务转移到在SZSE上市的公司，这对出勤要求的限制较小。我们的发现为外部监管如何影响新兴市场的董事出勤和投票行为提供了证据。SHID更有可能离开在SHSE上市的公司，并将其董事职务转移到在SZSE上市的公司，这对出勤的要求较少。我们的发现为外部监管如何影响新兴市场的董事出勤和投票行为提供了证据。SHID更有可能离开在SHSE上市的公司，并将其董事职务转移到在SZSE上市的公司，这对出勤的要求较少。我们的发现为外部监管如何影响新兴市场的董事出勤和投票行为提供了证据。