ABSTRACT

This article sheds light on the little discussed democratic period, directly after Sudanese independence in 1956 and preceding the military takeover in 1958. The article uses parliamentary and public discussions around an American aid offer as a lens to understand Sudanese perspectives on decolonisation, independence, dependence, sovereignty, and neo-colonialism in a Cold War context. The article aims to explore how politicians in post-independence Sudan perceived their range of potential political actions and outcomes. It argues that politicians prioritised the protection and strengthening of Sudanese sovereignty, but held strongly differing and at times contradicting views of what that meant; for example, accepting aid from the Americans was understood by the Umma Party as necessary for economic development and thus strengthening domestic sovereignty, while it was seen by the NUP as potentially weakening external sovereignty. The decisions of Sudanese politicians at the time were shaped by their fear of Sudan losing its independence once again. In making this argument, the article serves as a case study deconstructing theoretical conceptions of sovereignty as absolute and indivisible, showing that Sudanese politicians were acutely aware that sovereignty was bounded and dependent on compromises.

摘要

本文阐明了在1956年苏丹独立之后和1958年军事接管之前不久的鲜为人知的民主时期。本文利用围绕美国援助提议的议会和公开讨论，以了解苏丹对非殖民化，独立，依赖的观点冷战时期的主权，主权和新殖民主义。本文旨在探讨独立后苏丹的政客如何看待他们潜在的政治行动和成果。它认为，政客把保护和加强苏丹主权放在首位，但持不同意见，有时对此表示矛盾。例如，乌马党认为接受美国人的援助是经济发展，从而加强国内主权的必要条件，而国民党则认为这可能会削弱外部主权。苏丹政治家当时的决定是因为他们担心苏丹再次失去独立。在提出这一论点时，本文作为案例研究，对绝对和不可分割的主权理论概念进行了解构，表明苏丹政客敏锐地意识到主权是有界的，并取决于折衷方案。