ABSTRACT

‘Picking-the-winners’ selective R&D subsidies are provided to a few firms with high innovation capabilities. Thus, the applicants for subsidies might send misleading signals to stand out from others. This paper explores firms’ application strategies and finds that firms tend to increase the quantity of their R&D outputs as a signal of being highly innovative, even at the expense of reducing innovation quality.

中文翻译：

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选择性研发补贴与企业应用策略

摘要

向少数创新能力强的企业提供“优胜劣汰”的选择性研发补贴。因此，补贴申请者可能会发出误导性信号以脱颖而出。本文探讨了企业的应用策略，发现企业倾向于增加其研发产出的数量作为高度创新的信号，即使以降低创新质量为代价。