Traditional theory implies that fiscal federalism hinders redistribution and increases inequality. Decentralization might however improve predistribution. To obtain more precise empirical evidence on this relationship we introduce an interaction between tax decentralization and jurisdictional fragmentation and analyze its impact on pre- vs. after-tax inequality. The empirical strategy relies on the unique institutional setting and data consistency in Switzerland which allows to exploit cantonal variance since 1945. According to our findings, tax decentralization reduces income inequality as long as jurisdictional fragmentation remains limited. Significant effects in pre-tax income suggest an impact via the predistribution instead of the redistribution channel.

传统理论认为，财政联邦制阻碍了再分配并加剧了不平等。但是，权力下放可能会改善预分配。为了获得关于这种关系的更精确的经验证据，我们引入了税收分权与管辖权分割之间的相互作用，并分析了其对税前和税后不平等的影响。这种经验策略依靠瑞士独特的制度设置和数据一致性，自1945年以来就可以利用州的差异。根据我们的发现，只要管辖权分散仍然有限，税收分权就可以减少收入不平等。税前收入的重大影响表明通过预分配而不是重新分配渠道产生了影响。