Using an identification strategy based on the Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) framework, we assess the impacts of a capital surcharge for domestic systemically important banks (D-SIFIs) in Brazil on consumers’ costs after a regulatory change. We explore the discontinuous application of the regulation, which applies only to banks that present a ratio of total assets over GDP greater than 10%. Our findings suggest that banks are repassing the regulatory costs to their clients, either in higher loans or banking fee income.

中文翻译：

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市场支配力和银行法规：从RDD应用到巴西银行市场的证据

使用基于回归不连续性设计（RDD）框架的识别策略，我们评估了监管变更后巴西国内具有系统重要性的银行（D-SIFIs）资本附加费对消费者成本的影响。我们探索了该法规的不连续适用，该法规仅适用于总资产与GDP比率超过10％的银行。我们的发现表明，无论是贷款增加还是银行手续费收入增加，银行都在向客户转移监管成本。