In this article, we provide mechanisms for exchange economies with private information and interdependent values, which are ex post individually rational, incentive compatible, generate budget surplus, and are ex post nearly efficient, with many agents. Our framework is entirely prior-free, and we make no symmetry restrictions. The mechanisms can be implemented using a novel discriminatory conditional double auction, without knowledge of information structure or utility functions. We also show that no other mechanism satisfying the constraints can generate inefficiency of smaller order.

中文翻译：

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健壮的交易所机制设计

在本文中，我们为交换经济体提供了具有私人信息和相互依存的价值的机制，这些机制在事后个体理性，激励相容，产生预算盈余以及事后几乎有效的情况下，与许多主体合作。我们的框架是完全没有先验的，并且我们没有对称限制。该机制可以使用新颖的有条件的有条件的双重拍卖来实现，而无需了解信息结构或效用函数。我们还表明，没有其他满足约束条件的机制可以产生较小顺序的效率低下的问题。