The phenomenological movement begins in the Prolegomena to Husserl’s Logical Investigations as a philosophy of logic. Despite this, remarkably little attention has been paid to Husserl’s arguments in the Prolegomena in the contemporary philosophy of logic. In particular, the literature spawned by Gilbert Harman’s work on the normative status of logic is almost silent on Husserl’s contribution to this topic. I begin by raising a worry for Husserl’s conception of ‘pure logic’ similar to Harman’s challenge to explain the connection between logic and reasoning. If logic is the study of the forms of all possible theories, it will include the study of many logical consequence relations; by what criteria, then, should we select one (or a distinguished few) consequence relation(s) as correct? I consider how Husserl might respond to this worry by looking to his late account of the ‘genealogy of logic’ in connection with Gurwitsch’s claim that ‘[i]t is to prepredicative perceptual experience … that one must return for a radical clarification and for the definitive justification of logic’. Drawing also on Sartre and Heidegger, I consider how prepredicative experience might constrain or guide our selection of a logical consequence relation and our understanding of connectives like implication and negation.

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逻辑现象学会是什么样子？

现象学运动在开始 绪论 胡塞尔的 逻辑研究 作为逻辑的理念。尽管如此，在Prolegomena中很少关注胡塞尔的论点  在当代逻辑哲学中。特别是，吉尔伯特·哈曼（Gilbert Harman）关于逻辑的规范状态的工作所产生的文献几乎没有提及胡塞尔对这一主题的贡献。首先，我对胡塞尔的“纯逻辑”概念感到担忧，这类似于哈曼提出的解释逻辑与推理之间联系的挑战。如果逻辑是对所有可能理论形式的研究，那么它将包括对许多逻辑结果关系的研究。那么根据什么标准 我们应该选择一个（或少数几个）结果关系正确吗？我考虑到侯赛尔如何看待他最近对古尔维奇（Gurwitsch）的说法“逻辑的谱系”的陈述，以回应这种担忧，他声称“ [i]是对谓语的感性体验……必须返回以进行彻底的澄清，并为明确的逻辑证明”。我还借鉴萨特和海德格尔的观点，前瞻性的经验可能会如何约束或指导我们对逻辑结果关系的选择以及对连词（如暗示和否定）的理解。