Communication is integral to organizations and yet field evidence on the relation between communication and worker productivity remains scarce. We argue that a core role of communication is to transmit information that helps co-workers do their job better. We build a simple model in which workers choose the amount of communication by trading off this benefit against the time cost incurred by the sender, and use it to derive a set of empirical predictions. We then exploit a natural experiment in an organization where problems arrive and must be sequentially dealt with by two workers. For exogenous reasons, the first worker can sometimes communicate face-to-face with their colleague. Consistently with the predictions of our model, we find that: (1) the second worker works faster (at the cost of the first worker having less time to deal with incoming problems) when face-to-face communication is possible, (2) this effect is stronger when the second worker is busier and for homogenous and closely located teams, and (3) the (career) incentives of workers determine how much they communicate with their colleagues. We also find that workers partially internalise social outcomes in their communication decisions. Our findings illustrate how workers in teams adjust the amount of mutual communication to its costs and benefits.

中文翻译：

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组织中的面对面交流

沟通是组织不可或缺的组成部分，但关于沟通与工人生产率之间关系的实地证据仍然很少。我们认为，沟通的核心作用是传递有助于同事更好地完成工作的信息。我们建立了一个简单的模型，在该模型中，工人通过权衡此收益与发送者所花费的时间成本来选择通信量，并使用它来得出一组经验预测。然后，我们在组织出现问题的组织中进行自然实验，并且必须由两名工人依次处理。由于外在的原因，第一批员工有时可以与同事面对面交流。与模型的预测一致，我们发现：（1）在可能进行面对面交流时，第二个工人工作更快（以第一个工人花更少的时间来处理传入的问题为代价）；（2）当第二个工人比较忙时，对于第二个工人来说，这种效果会更强均质且位置紧密的团队，以及（3）工人的（职业）激励因素决定了他们与同事之间的沟通程度。我们还发现，工人在沟通决策中部分内部化了社会结果。我们的研究结果说明了团队中的员工如何根据其成本和收益调整相互交流的数量。我们还发现，工人在沟通决策中部分内部化了社会结果。我们的研究结果说明了团队中的员工如何根据其成本和收益调整相互交流的数量。我们还发现，工人在沟通决策中部分内部化了社会结果。我们的研究结果说明了团队中的员工如何根据其成本和收益调整相互交流的数量。