We revisit work that has indicated that the presence and strength of political budget cycles depend on a range of conditioning factors. We point to the importance of voter time preference and argue that, in relatively poorer countries, high discount rates will lead impatient voters to value immediate consumption due to fiscal expansions over the future benefits from fiscally responsible policies. Consistent with this assertion, our empirical evidence, based on a sample of up to 67 low- and high-income countries over the period 1995 to 2016, indicates that budget cycles emerge in countries with a GDP per capita below a threshold of around 30,000 PPP-adjusted constant 2017 U.S. dollars. This goes beyond previous explanations of budget cycles based on voters with short memories who underestimate the costs of expansionary policies, voters with little experience with democracy or voters who are poorly informed about the competence or policy preferences of political candidates.

中文翻译：

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有条件的政治预算周期：时间偏好的作用

我们重新审视了表明政治预算周期的存在和强度取决于一系列条件因素的工作。我们指出了选民时间偏好的重要性，并认为，在相对较贫穷的国家，高贴现率将导致不耐烦的选民因财政扩张而重视即时消费，而不是财政负责任政策的未来收益。与这一断言一致，我们基于 1995 年至 2016 年期间多达 67 个低收入和高收入国家的样本的经验证据表明，预算周期出现在人均 GDP 低于约 30,000 PPP 阈值的国家-调整后的2017年不变美元。这超出了先前对预算周期的解释，这些解释基于记忆短暂的选民低估了扩张性政策的成本，