Comparing Buddhist and contemporary analytic views about mereological composition reveals significant dissimilarities about the purposes that constrain successful answers to mereological questions, the kinds of considerations taken to be probative in justifying those answers, and the value of mereological inquiry. I develop these dissimilarities by examining three questions relevant to those who deny the existence of composite wholes. The first is a question of justification: What justifies denying the existence of composite wholes as more reasonable than affirming their existence? The second is a question of ontology: Under what conditions are many partless individuals arranged composite-wise? The third is a question of reasonableness: Why, if there are no composites available to experience, do “the folk” find it reasonable to believe there are? I motivate each question, sketch some analytic answers for each, develop in more detail answers from the Theravādin Buddhist scholar Buddhaghosa, and extract comparative lessons.

中文翻译：

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分析和佛教视角下的分流构成

比较佛教和当代关于分体学组成的分析观点，揭示了限制对分体学问题的成功回答的目的、在证明这些答案的合理性时所采取的各种考虑以及分体学探究的价值方面的显着差异。我通过研究与否认复合整体存在的人相关的三个问题来发展这些差异。第一个是正当性问题：有什么理由否认复合整体的存在比肯定它们的存在更合理？第二个是本体论的问题：在什么条件下，许多不可分割的个体是复合排列的？第三个是合理性问题：为什么，如果没有可供体验的复合材料，“民间”认为有理由相信有吗？我激发每个问题，为每个问题勾勒出一些分析答案，从小乘佛教学者佛果萨那里得到更详细的答案，并提取比较课程。