The paper investigates what type of motivation can be given for adopting a knowledge-based decision theory (hereafter, KBDT). KBDT seems to have several advantages over competing theories of rationality. It is commonly argued that this theory would naturally fit with the intuitive idea that being rational is doing what we take to be best given what we know, an idea often supported by appeal to ordinary folk appraisals. Moreover, KBDT seems to strike a perfect balance between the problematic extremes of subjectivist and objectivist decision theory. We argue that these alleged advantages do not stand up to a closer scrutiny: KBDT inherits the same kinds of problems as alternative decision theoretic frameworks but doesn’t retain any of the respective advantages. Moreover, differently from other knowledge-action principles advanced in the literature, KBDT cannot fully explain the intuitive connections between knowledge and rational action. We conclude that the most serious challenge for knowledge-based decision theorists is to provide a substantive rationale for the adoption of such a view.

本文研究了采用基于知识的决策理论（以下简称 KBDT）的动机类型。与竞争的理性理论相比，KBDT 似乎有几个优势。人们普遍认为，这一理论自然符合直觉观念，即理性就是在我们所知道的情况下做我们认为最好的事情，这一想法通常受到普通民间评价的支持。此外，KBDT 似乎在主观主义和客观主义决策理论的问题极端之间取得了完美的平衡。我们认为，这些所谓的优势经不起仔细审查：KBDT 继承了与替代决策理论框架相同类型的问题，但没有保留任何各自的优势。此外，与文献中提出的其他知识-行动原则不同，KBDT 无法完全解释知识与理性行动之间的直观联系。我们得出结论，对于基于知识的决策理论家来说，最严峻的挑战是为采纳这种观点提供一个实质性的理由。