We consider infrastructure provision by a foreign investor when the domestic bureaucracy is corrupt, but also cares for domestic welfare. Bureaucrats bargain with the investor over price and (potentially) bribes, both before the investment is sunk and afterwards, using the threat of expropriation. We show that domestic welfare may be greater in equilibria with bribery than in equilibria without. We specify conditions under which changes in the degree of bureaucratic centralization or of bureaucratic care have a positive, negative, or nonmonotonic effect on domestic welfare. The impact of centralization on domestic welfare is mediated through the level of bureaucratic care.

中文翻译：

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贿赂、劫持和官僚结构

当国内官僚机构腐败时，我们考虑外国投资者提供的基础设施，但也关心国内福利。在投资沉没之前和之后，官僚们使用征用的威胁与投资者就价格和（可能的）贿赂进行讨价还价。我们表明，在有贿赂的均衡情况下，家庭福利可能比没有贿赂的均衡情况下更大。我们详细说明了官僚集权程度或官僚关怀程度的变化对家庭福利产生积极、消极或非单调影响的条件。中央集权对家庭福利的影响是通过官僚关怀的水平来调节的。