Organizations often promote procedural justice by increasing the transparency of managerial decisions and encouraging employees’ voice in the decision process. We experimentally investigate how implementing these control policies in hierarchical organizations (owners vs. managers vs. employees) affects managers’ resource-allocation decision and employee effort. We predict and find that managers allocate more resources to employees, lowering owners’ return, when the allocation decision is transparent than when it is not transparent, despite being incentivized to increase owners’ return. Further, managers allocate more resources to employees when employees can voice their desired outcome than when employees’ voice is not allowed, but only if the allocation decision is transparent. Managers’ intention to exchange gifts with employees mediates these effects. We also find that, when employees have a voice, their effort is influenced by whether the allocation reaches their desired level. The implications of our findings for management control theory and practice are discussed.

组织通常通过提高管理决策的透明度和鼓励员工在决策过程中的发言权来促进程序正义。我们通过实验研究在等级组织（所有者、经理和员工）中实施这些控制策略如何影响经理的资源分配决策和员工努力。我们预测并发现，尽管被激励以增加所有者的回报，但当分配决策透明时，管理者会向员工分配更多的资源，从而降低所有者的回报。此外，与不允许员工发表意见的情况相比，当员工可以表达他们想要的结果时，管理者会为员工分配更多的资源，但前提是分配决策是透明的。管理者与员工交换礼物的意图调节了这些影响。我们还发现，当员工有发言权时，他们的努力会受到分配是否达到他们想要的水平的影响。讨论了我们的研究结果对管理控制理论和实践的影响。