A side-channel attack (SCA)-resistant AES S-box implementation is proposed, which is an improvement from the power-aware hiding (PAH) S-box but with higher security and a smaller area. We use the composite field approach and apply the PAH method to the inversion in the nonlinear kernel and a masking method to the other parts. In addition, a delay-matched enable control technique is used to suppress glitches in the masked parts. The evaluation results show that its area is contracted to 63.3% of the full PAH S-box, and its power-delay product is much lower than that of the masking implementation. The leakage assessment using simulation power traces concludes that it has no detectable leakage under t-test and that it at least can thwart the moment-correlation analysis using 665 000 noiseless traces.

提出了一种抗侧信道攻击（SCA）的AES S-box实现，它是对功率感知隐藏（PAH）S-box的改进，但具有更高的安全性和更小的面积。我们使用复合场方法，并将 PAH 方法应用于非线性内核中的反演，并将掩蔽方法应用于其他部分。此外，延迟匹配使能控制技术用于抑制被屏蔽部分的毛刺。评估结果表明，其面积缩小到全 PAH S-box 的 63.3%，其功率延迟乘积远低于掩蔽实现。使用仿真功率迹线的泄漏评估得出结论，它在t检验下没有可检测到的泄漏，并且它至少可以阻止使用 665 000 条无噪声迹线的矩相关分析。