当前位置: X-MOL 学术J. Semicond. › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
Side-channel attack-resistant AES S-box with hidden subfield inversion and glitch-free masking
Journal of Semiconductors ( IF 4.8 ) Pub Date : 2021-03-19 , DOI: 10.1088/1674-4926/42/3/032402
Xiangyu Li 1, 2 , Pengyuan Jiao 1, 3 , Chaoqun Yang 1, 3
Affiliation  

A side-channel attack (SCA)-resistant AES S-box implementation is proposed, which is an improvement from the power-aware hiding (PAH) S-box but with higher security and a smaller area. We use the composite field approach and apply the PAH method to the inversion in the nonlinear kernel and a masking method to the other parts. In addition, a delay-matched enable control technique is used to suppress glitches in the masked parts. The evaluation results show that its area is contracted to 63.3% of the full PAH S-box, and its power-delay product is much lower than that of the masking implementation. The leakage assessment using simulation power traces concludes that it has no detectable leakage under t-test and that it at least can thwart the moment-correlation analysis using 665 000 noiseless traces.



中文翻译:

具有隐藏子场反转和无毛刺掩蔽的侧通道抗攻击 AES S-box

提出了一种抗侧信道攻击(SCA)的AES S-box实现,它是对功率感知隐藏(PAH)S-box的改进,但具有更高的安全性和更小的面积。我们使用复合场方法,并将 PAH 方法应用于非线性内核中的反演,并将掩蔽方法应用于其他部分。此外,延迟匹配使能控制技术用于抑制被屏蔽部分的毛刺。评估结果表明,其面积缩小到全 PAH S-box 的 63.3%,其功率延迟乘积远低于掩蔽实现。使用仿真功率迹线的泄漏评估得出结论,它在t检验下没有可检测到的泄漏,并且它至少可以阻止使用 665 000 条无噪声迹线的矩相关分析。

更新日期:2021-03-19
down
wechat
bug