This paper examines the effect of credit rating disagreements on merger and acquisition (M&A) decisions. We show that acquirers with split ratings prefer to use stock to finance their acquisitions. More importantly, we find that acquirers with split ratings experience lower announcement returns. Further analysis shows that overpayment by acquirers with split ratings is concentrated in acquirers with entrenched managers. Our results are robust to alternative identification strategies. Overall, our evidence indicates that credit rating disagreements are heavily priced in the M&A market.

中文翻译：

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并购市场上是否对信用评级分歧进行定价？

本文研究了信用评级分歧对并购（M＆A）决策的影响。我们显示，具有不同评级的收购方更喜欢使用股票来为其收购筹集资金。更重要的是，我们发现评级不同的收购方的公告收益较低。进一步的分析表明，评级不同的收购方的超额付款集中在经理人根深蒂固的收购方中。我们的结果对于替代识别策略是可靠的。总体而言，我们的证据表明，信用评级方面的分歧在并购市场上的定价很高。