We study efficiency and distributional effects of conditioning transfers on educational investments by parents, in an OLG model with missing financial markets and heterogeneity of learning ability. Conditional cash transfers (CCT) can be designed to generate a Pareto improvement relative to either laissez faire, or unconditional transfers such as universal basic income proposals. This applies irrespective of whether the status quo involves underinvestment or overinvestment in education from a first-best perspective, or the nature and extent of parental altruism towards children. The CCT corrects a market failure of insurance and lack of consumption smoothing for parents with respect to random realizations of ability of their offspring.

在缺少金融市场和学习能力异质性的OLG模型中，我们研究了条件转移对父母的教育投资的效率和分配效应。可以设计有条件现金转移（CCT）来产生相对于自由放任或无条件转移（例如普遍基本收入建议）的帕累托改进。不论现状是从最佳角度看，是教育方面的投资不足还是投资过度，还是父母对孩子的利他主义的性质和程度，这一点均适用。CCT针对父母后代能力的随机实现，纠正了保险的市场失灵和缺乏使父母平滑的消费。