This study proposes an emission-intensity-based emission tax as a policy solution for negative environmental externality in oligopoly markets. Emissions are taxed when firms' emission intensities exceed their target level. We show that even under imperfect competition, this emission pricing policy leads to the first-best outcome. The optimal tax rate is equal to the Pigovian tax. This principle can also apply to tradable emission permits traded based on emission intensity targets.

中文翻译：

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不完全竞争下基于排放强度目标的排放定价政策的最优性

这项研究提出了一种基于排放强度的排放税作为寡头市场中负面的环境外部性的政策解决方案。当企业的排放强度超过其目标水平时，就要对排放征税。我们证明，即使在不完全竞争的情况下，这种排放定价政策也能带来最佳结果。最佳税率等于Pigovian税。该原则还可适用于根据排放强度目标进行交易的可交易的排放许可证。