In the private language argument (PLA), Wittgenstein raises a paradox, namely that a sensation is not a something, but not a nothing either. McDowell argues that Wittgenstein unnecessarily eliminates inner sensations. By contrast, McDowell insists that sensations are perfectly good somethings, namely concept-involving objects. Hao Tang praises McDowell’s idea that Wittgenstein’s target is the myth of the inner given, namely the private object, but he criticises McDowell’s interpretation of Wittgenstein as eliminating inner sensations. On his interpretation, Wittgenstein does not eliminate the sensation as a concept-involving object. In this article, I advance two main arguments: (1) Wittgenstein objects to inner sensations being concept-involving objects because he rejects the model of “object-designation”; and (2) despite (1), Wittgenstein does not eliminate sensations nor does he deny that we can conceive of them; rather, he thinks that people conceptualise sensations in ways other than as concept-involving objects.

在私人语言论证（PLA）中，维特根斯坦提出了一个悖论，即感觉不是某种东西，也不是一种虚无。麦克道威尔认为维特根斯坦不必要地消除了内在的感觉。相比之下，McDowell坚持认为，感觉完全是一件好事，即涉及概念的物体。唐浩赞扬麦克道尔的观点，即维特根斯坦的目标是内在给予的神话，即私人对象，但他批评麦克道尔对维特根斯坦的解释是消除内在的感觉。根据他的解释，维特根斯坦并没有消除这种感觉，因为它涉及概念。在本文中，我提出了两个主要论点：（1）维特根斯坦反对内在感觉是涉及概念的对象，因为他拒绝了“对象指定”模型；和（2）尽管（1），维特根斯坦并没有消除感觉，也没有否认我们可以设想这些感觉。相反，他认为人们以其他方式将感觉概念化，而不是作为涉及概念的对象。