Abstract:

In this paper, I argue that Hume's response to his skeptical problem is purely practical. First, I argue that Hume's terminology of "philosophy" is the textual key to identifying his evaluations of beliefs from that standpoint which is normative for the sciences. Second, I reexamine the crisis of Treatise 1.4.7 (SBN 263–274) in the light of "philosophy." Hume faces a "life-or-philosophy" dilemma: due to his skeptical arguments, practically indispensable core beliefs of common life and science are not philosophically acceptable. The Title Principle is not a philosophical norm but rather subordinates philosophical norms to practical interests. Third, I explain Hume's practical justification for a moderate pursuit of philosophy. He has purely practical reasons for ignoring the skeptical demands of philosophy, and purely practical reasons for following philosophy in his constructive scientific research.

摘要：

在本文中，我认为休ume对他的怀疑问题的回应纯粹是切实可行的。首先，我认为休ume的“哲学”术语是从这种对科学具有规范性的观点确定其对信仰的评价的文本关键。其次，我重新审视《论着》的危机1.4.7（SBN 263–274）遵循“哲学”。休ume面临着“生命还是哲学”的困境：由于他的怀疑论点，从共同的生活和科学角度来看，实际上不可或缺的核心信念在哲学上是不可接受的。标题原则不是哲学规范，而是将哲学规范服从实际利益。第三，我解释了休ume对适度追求哲学的实践辩护。他有纯粹的实践理由忽略了哲学的怀疑性要求，而有纯粹的实践理由是在他的建设性科学研究中遵循哲学。