Abstract:

The purpose of this essay is to contribute to the understanding of Hume's account of the faculty of reason and to examine some implications for interpreting the broader arc of his philosophy. I argue that Hume develops his thinking about reason dialectically in Book 1 of the Treatise by creating a reflective dynamic between two different concepts of reason. The first concept of reason (reason1) is a narrow faculty that operates on ideas via intuition and demonstration. The second concept (reason2) is a broader imagination-dependent faculty that augments reason1 with the activity of probable reasoning. The dialectic between reason1 and reason2 leads Hume to skepticism, which is compounded by the fact that reason2 self-subverts if not constrained. Hume resolves these matters in the conclusion to Book 1 by conditionally committing to apply reason2 to matters of common life and social interest in a diffidently skeptical manner.

摘要：

本文的目的是促进对休ume关于理性能力的论述的理解，并探讨一些对于解释休ume的哲学之涵义的启示。我认为休ume在《论语》第一卷中辩证地发展了他对理性的思考。通过在两个不同的理性概念之间创造一种反思的动力。理性的第一个概念（原因1）是一个狭narrow的教职员工，通过直觉和示范来运作思想。第二个概念（原因2）是更广泛的依赖于想象力的能力，它通过可能的推理活动来增强了推理1。原因1和原因2之间的辩证法使休ume产生了怀疑态度，而如果没有约束，则原因2会自我颠覆，这一事实使情况变得更加复杂。休ume通过有条件地承诺以不同的怀疑态度将理性2应用于共同生活和社会利益问题，从而解决了《第一卷》结论中的这些问题。