We examine the impact of social networks between independent directors and the CEO on firm risk. Employing the deaths and retirements of socially connected independent directors and the passage of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act for two identifications, we find that board-CEO social networks have a positive impact on firm risk. Specifically, CEOs who are socially connected to their independent directors are motivated to adopt riskier investment, operating and financing strategies. This positive influence is more pronounced for prior under-performing firms and for CEOs with low power or overconfidence, indicating that board-CEO social networks act as career insurance and a power-enhancing mechanism to encourage managerial risk-taking.

我们研究了独立董事与首席执行官之间的社交网络对公司风险的影响。利用与社会相关的独立董事的死亡和退休，以及通过2002年《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》的两项认定，我们发现董事会-首席执行官社交网络对公司风险具有积极影响。具体而言，与独立董事建立社会联系的首席执行官被激励采取风险更大的投资，运营和融资策略。对于那些表现欠佳的公司和权力低下或过分自信的CEO来说，这种积极影响更为明显，这表明董事会-CEO社交网络充当了职业保险和增强权力的机制，以鼓励管理者承担风险。