This paper investigates the effect of insider ownership on stock price synchronicity. Specifically, for countries with poor investor protection, the managerial entrenchment effect dominates. When ownership increases, synchronicity increases at an increasing rate. However, for countries with strong investor protections, managerial entrenchment effect only dominates the incentive alignment effect when controlling ownership increases initially. As controlling ownership continues to increase, the incentive alignment effect becomes stronger and the net effect is reversed, leading to a more transparent firm. Additional tests reveal that financial reporting framework and insider trading law enforcement are crucial external governance channels affecting stock price synchronicity.

本文研究了内部人持股对股价同步性的影响。具体而言，对于投资者保护不力的国家，管理巩固效应占主导地位。当所有权增加时，同步性以增加的速度增加。然而，对于投资者保护较强的国家，当控制权最初增加时，管理层的巩固效应仅支配激励调整效应。随着控股权的不断增加，激励调整效应变得更强，净效应被逆转，导致公司更加透明。其他测试表明，财务报告框​​架和内幕交易执法是影响股价同步性的重要外部治理渠道。