Policymakers and peacebuilding research often focus on rebel groups when studying demobilization and integration processes, but post-war governments must also manage the non-state militias that helped them gain or maintain power. Why do some post-war governments disintegrate their militia allies, while others integrate them into the military? We argue that when a salient ethnic difference exists between the (new) ruling elite and an allied militia, a process of mutual uncertainty in the post-war period will incentivize governments to disintegrate the group. However, governments will be most likely to integrate their militias when the military has sufficient coercive capabilities but few organizational hindrances to re-organizing. Using new data on the post-war fates of victorious militias across all civil conflicts from 1989 to 2014, we find robust support for these claims. The results suggest that a government’s optimal militia management strategy is shaped by both social and organizational constraints during the post-war period.

决策者和建设和平研究在研究复员和融合进程时通常将重点放在叛军组织上，但是战后政府还必须管理帮助其获得或维持权力的非国家民兵。为什么有些战后政府解散民兵盟友，而另一些则将其融入军队？我们认为，当（新）统治精英与盟军民兵之间存在明显的族裔差异时，战后时期的相互不确定性进程将激励政府瓦解该集团。但是，当军队具有足够的强制能力但很少有组织上的重组障碍时，政府将最有可能整合其民兵。利用有关1989年至2014年所有内战中战胜民兵的战后命运的新数据，我们为这些要求提供了有力的支持。结果表明，战后时期，政府的最佳民兵管理策略受到社会和组织制约因素的影响。