This paper presents a positive and normative study of a world financial market when sovereign countries can default on their debt. We construct a tractable model that enables us to study sovereign default in general equilibrium. The amount of safe assets is thus endogenous and determined by international risk-sharing. We characterize the equilibrium structure and we show that the market equilibrium can generate multiple equilibria. In addition, the market equilibrium is not constrained-efficient because countries do not fully internalize the value of their debt being used as liquidity. We prove that a world fund issuing a safe asset increases aggregate welfare. The fund's relationship with the IMF's Special Drawing Rights is discussed.

本文对主权国家可能违约的世界金融市场进行了积极而规范的研究。我们构建了一个易于处理的模型，使我们能够研究一般均衡中的主权违约。因此，安全资产的数量是内生的，并由国际风险分担来确定。我们描述了均衡结构的特征，并表明市场均衡可以产生多重均衡。另外，市场均衡不是约束有效的，因为各国没有完全内部化其用作流动性的债务的价值。我们证明，发行安全资产的世界基金可以增加总福利。讨论了该基金与国际货币基金组织特别提款权的关系。