Separate identification of moral hazard and adverse selection in insurance markets is empirically difficult. To overcome this limitation, this paper develops a series of controlled laboratory experiments to examine how adverse selection and moral hazard separately affect agent performance in a real-effort task. We explore how agent performance changes across a baseline with no insurance option, a treatment where individuals can choose to purchase insurance, and a third treatment where individuals must purchase insurance. We believe our experimental design can be used as a wind-tunnel that is flexible enough to incorporate alternative price changes or contract designs while permitting researchers to separately identify moral hazard and adverse selection under those conditions.

在经验上很难分别确定保险市场中的道德风险和逆向选择。为了克服此限制，本文开发了一系列受控实验室实验，以检验逆向选择和道德风险如何分别影响实际工作中的特工绩效。我们探讨了在没有保险选择的情况下，座席绩效如何在基线上发生变化，个人可以选择购买保险的待遇，以及个人必须购买保险的第三种待遇。我们认为，我们的实验设计可以用作风洞，它具有足够的灵活性，可以结合其他价格变动或合同设计，同时允许研究人员在这些条件下分别识别道德风险和逆向选择。