The number of investor–state arbitration disputes has increased to more than 1000 to date, but their determinants are still not fully understood. We argue that in the wake of severe macroeconomic turmoil—economic crisis—policymakers have strong incentives to implement regulatory changes, even if these allegedly breach protection standards are provided by International Investment Agreements (IIAs). We base our empirical analysis on a unique country-dyadic dataset containing 961 investor–state arbitration claims over the 1987–2017 period. Our findings support the results of the related literature, which stresses the importance of good governance for avoiding arbitration cases. In contrast to this literature, we provide robust evidence consistent with a positive statistical association of economic crises and the number of investor–state arbitration disputes. Our investigation suggests that governments risk paying compensation to foreign investors for their actions in times when public regulation is needed in other areas. This may warrant a reconsideration of economic emergency measures of governments and the national security clause in International Investment Agreements in the current reform debate.

中文翻译：

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经济危机会引发基于条约的投资者与国家仲裁纠纷吗？

迄今为止，投资者与国家间仲裁纠纷的数量已增加到 1000 多件，但其决定因素仍未完全清楚。我们认为，在严重的宏观经济动荡（经济危机）之后，政策制定者有强烈的动机来实施监管变革，即使这些据称违反了国际投资协议 (IIA) 提供的保护标准。我们的实证分析基于一个独特的国家二元数据集，该数据集包含 1987-2017 年期间的 961 项投资者-国家仲裁索赔。我们的研究结果支持相关文献的结果，这些文献强调了良好治理对于避免仲裁案件的重要性。与这些文献相比，我们提供了有力的证据，与经济危机和投资者-国家仲裁纠纷的数量之间存在积极的统计关联。我们的调查表明，当其他领域需要公共监管时，政府可能会为外国投资者的行为支付赔偿金。这可能需要在当前的改革辩论中重新考虑政府的经济紧急措施和国际投资协议中的国家安全条款。