Many features of quantum mechanics (QM) suggest that, at the microscopic level, objects sometimes fail to determinately instantiate their properties. In recent years, many have argued that this phenomenon indicates the existence of an ontological kind of indeterminacy, often called metaphysical indeterminacy, which is supposed to affect the ontology of QM. As insisted by Glick ('Against Quantum Indeterminacy, 2017, Thought), however, once we look at the major realist approaches to QM we learn that the indeterminacy disappears from the description of the world at its most fundamental level. This absence might be taken as a good reason for adopting some form of eliminativism towards quantum mechanical indeterminacy. The aim of this paper is to distinguish three ways of defending eliminativism, and to argue that none of them eventually succeeds. The upshot is that QM does in fact suggest the existence of metaphysical indeterminacy, although only as an emergent phenomenon.

中文翻译：

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紧急量子不确定性

量子力学 (QM) 的许多特征表明，在微观层面，物体有时无法确定地实例化它们的属性。近年来，许多人认为这种现象表明存在一种本体论的不确定性，通常称为形而上学的不确定性，它应该会影响 QM 的本体论。然而，正如 Glick 所坚持的（'Against Quantum Indeterminacy, 2017, Thought），一旦我们研究了 QM 的主要现实主义方法，我们就会了解到不确定性从对世界最基本层面的描述中消失了。这种缺席可能被视为采用某种形式的排除主义的一个很好的理由走向量子力学的不确定性。本文的目的是区分三种捍卫排除主义的方法，并论证它们最终都不会成功。结果是 QM 实际上确实暗示了形而上学不确定性的存在，尽管只是作为一种新兴现象。