In The Tyranny of the Ideal (2016), Gerald Gaus offers a critique of ideal theory, as practiced by political philosophers from Plato to the present day. This critique rests upon a formal model Gaus develops of a theory of the ideal. This model supposedly captures the essential features of any theory that both identifies an ideal society and uses that society to orient political activity. A theory must do the former or fail to count as an ideal theory; a theory must do the latter or prove useless. Gaus then employs this model to argue against ideal theory, using it as the foundation for an alternative model for how political philosophers should think about justice. Unfortunately, Gaus’ model of a theory of the ideal is badly flawed. Gaus fails to demonstrate the desirability of an ideal theory functioning in the manner his model suggests. Moreover, his model bears no correspondence to any existing contemporary theory of justice. In the end, Gaus’ model fails to provide any reason to believe there is any tyranny of the ideal to be overthrown.

中文翻译：

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理想理论：真假

在《理想的暴政》（2016 年）中，杰拉尔德·高斯（Gerald Gaus）对理想理论进行了批判，正如从柏拉图到现在的政治哲学家所实践的那样。这种批判基于高斯发展的理想理论的正式模型。据推测，该模型捕捉了任何既确定理想社会又利用该社会来指导政治活动的理论的基本特征。一个理论必须做到前者，否则就不能算作理想的理论；一个理论必须做后者，否则就会被证明是无用的。然后高斯使用这个模型来反对理想理论，将其用作政治哲学家应该如何思考正义的替代模型的基础。不幸的是，高斯的理想理论模型存在严重缺陷。高斯未能证明理想理论以他的模型所建议的方式运作的可取性。而且，他的模型与任何现有的当代正义理论都没有对应关系。最终，高斯的模型没有提供任何理由相信有任何要推翻的理想暴​​政。