This paper accomplishes three goals. First, the essay demonstrates that Edmund Husserl’s theory of meaning consciousness from his 1901 Logical Investigations is internally inconsistent and falls apart upon closer inspection. I show that Husserl, in 1901, describes non-intuitive meaning consciousness as a direct parallel or as a ‘mirror’ of intuitive consciousness. He claims that non-intuitive meaning acts, like intuitions, have substance and represent their objects. I reveal that, by defining meaning acts in this way, Husserl cannot account for our experiences of countersensical, absurd, or impossible meanings. Second, I examine how Husserl came to recognize this 1901 mistake in his 1913/14 Revisions to the Sixth Logical Investigation (Husserliana XX-1/2). I discuss how he accordingly reformulates his understanding of non-intuitive meaning acts from the ground up in those Revisions, where this also allows for him to properly account for the experience of impossible meanings. Instead of describing them as mirrors of intuitions, Husserl takes non-intuitive meaning acts to be modifications of intuitions, where they have no substance and do not represent their objects. Finally, in the conclusion to this essay, I demonstrate how this fundamental change to his understanding of meaning consciousness forced Husserl to revise other central tenets of his philosophy, such that the trajectory of his thought can only be properly understood in light of these revisions to his theory of non-intuitive meaning consciousness.

本文实现了三个目标。首先，文章从1901年的逻辑调查论证了埃德蒙·胡塞尔的意义意识理论内部不一致，在仔细检查后会分崩离析。我表明，胡塞尔（Husserl）在1901年将非直觉意义意识描述为直觉意识的直接平行或“镜像”。他声称非直觉意义的行为就像直觉一样，具有实质性并代表其对象。我发现，通过定义以这种方式行事的意义，胡塞尔无法解释我们对反义，荒谬或不可能意义的体验。其次，我研究了胡塞尔在他的1913/14第六次逻辑调查修订本（Husserliana XX-1 / 2）中是如何认识到1901年这一错误的。我将讨论他如何相应地从那些修订本中重新构建他对非直觉意义行为的理解，这也使他能够正确地解释不可能意义的经历。胡塞尔没有将它们描述为直觉的镜子，而是将非直觉的意义行为作为对直觉的修改，在这种情况下，它们没有实质性内容，也不代表其对象。最后，在本文的结论中，我展示了对他对意义意识的理解的这一根本变化是如何迫使胡塞尔修改其哲学的其他中心宗旨的，从而使他的思想轨迹只能根据这些修改而得到正确理解。他的非直觉意义意识理论。