We advance social identity theory in the context of corporate governance research by evaluating how experiences outside the audit committee (AC) relate to AC members’ (ACMs’) professional identities and how these identities then map into ACMs’ responsibilities, how ACMs perceive that they add value, and how ACMs aid in the resolution of difficult judgments and decisions. We identify and evaluate four non-exclusive ACM social identities: executive management, financial management, investment management, and audit partner. We find that prior experiences relate to the social identities with which ACMs identify, yet identities also develop without role-relevant experiences. Interpreting the interviews leads us to propose a novel theory – mediational activism – a hybrid perspective whereby the ACM acts in multiple seemingly incongruent modes as a monitor, collaborator, and/or advocate with the intent to organize collective understanding, action, and mutually equitable outcomes. We find that ACMs’ perceptions of their primary role-relevant responsibilities are consistent with agency theory and extensive mediational activism, while perceptions of value-add are more consistent with the theory of resource dependence and reflect the desire to leverage prior experiences. Finally, we provide evidence on a host of difficult judgments and decisions that ACMs oversee, and find that they sometimes use typical negotiation strategies such as contending and compromising, but rarely resort to offering concessions. Employing these strategies differs based on social identities, but regardless of their identities ACMs most commonly approach their oversight role in resolving difficult judgments and decisions by adopting a mediational activism perspective.

我们通过评估审计委员会 (AC) 之外的经验如何与审计委员会成员 (ACM) 的职业身份相关联以及这些身份如何映射到 ACM 的职责中，以及 ACM 如何看待他们在公司治理研究的背景下推进社会认同理论增加价值，以及 ACM 如何帮助解决困难的判断和决策。我们识别和评估四种非排他性的 ACM 社会身份：执行管理、财务管理、投资管理和审计合作伙伴。我们发现，先前的经验与 ACM 所认同的社会身份有关，但身份也在没有与角色相关的经验的情况下发展。对访谈的解读使我们提出了一种新的理论——中介行动主义——一种混合观点，即 ACM 以多种看似不一致的模式作为监督者、合作者和/或倡导者，旨在组织集体理解、行动和相互公平的结果. 我们发现 ACM 对其主要角色相关责任的看法与代理理论和广泛的中介行动主义一致，而增值的看法与资源依赖理论更一致，并反映了利用先前经验的愿望。最后，我们提供了关于 ACM 监督的一系列艰难判断和决定的证据，并发现他们有时会使用典型的谈判策略，例如竞争和妥协，但很少诉诸于提供让步。