Using the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 as a quasi-natural experiment to identify the impact of corporate governance reform on foreign exchange risk hedging, we find that the substantial improvements in governance standards increased derivatives hedging and reduced foreign exchange exposure. The results are robust whether we consider initial reform gap or actual implementation, focus on legally required governance measures or include voluntary concomitant reforms. The economic magnitude of the effect is large. Our findings are corroborated by cross-sectional evidence, showing that firms with larger foreign markets exposure and a larger distortion in CEO incentives react more strongly to the reform. Financial hedges are implemented rapidly whereas exposure measures that encompass operational hedges take more time to adjust.

使用2002年的《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》作为准自然实验来确定公司治理改革对外汇风险对冲的影响，我们发现，治理标准的实质性改善增加了衍生品对冲并减少了外汇敞口。无论我们考虑初始改革的差距还是实际实施，关注法律要求的治理措施还是包括自愿伴随的改革，结果都是有力的。这种影响的经济规模很大。我们的发现得到了横截面证据的佐证，这些证据表明，具有较大国外市场敞口和CEO激励扭曲较大的公司对改革的反应更加强烈。金融套期保值实施迅速，而包含运营套期保值的风险敞口措施需要花费更多时间进行调整。