The Republic of Korea faces a rapidly aging population that is more reliant on public pension support but pension contributions are insufficient to support its long-term obligations. As a result, there is a growing debate on what type of reforms to the current defined-pension system could balance the long-term funding of the system with insuring benefit levels for old and new beneficiaries. In this paper, we develop and estimate a dynamic behavioral model that captures essential elements of the National Pension Scheme (NPS) and behavioral responses in labor supply, savings and benefit claiming to changes in the public pension system using a nationally-representative sample of married couples nearing retirement from the Korean Longitudinal Study of Aging (KLoSA). We use the model estimates to evaluate the effect of counterfactual policy experiments such as increases in the contribution rate and the extension of normal retirement age on the decision to work or not work, savings and benefit claiming among individuals near retirement. While these policies are aimed at shoring up the NPS, our model demonstrates that changes to the contribution rate could discourage work and savings in married households near retirement. In particular, a 2 percentage point immediate increase in the contribution rate would reduce household savings by 2 percent among poor households, as well as reduce labor participation among wives by 3 percent and among husbands by less than a percent. When we simulate the same increase in the contribution rate in even increments over five years, households anticipate the policy change and increase their savings to compensate for the future fall in income, dissipating undesirable behavioral responses such as decreased work and savings. In contrast, an increase of 2 years in the normal retirement age leads to a 3 percent increase in household savings, and to an increase in both husband and wife labor force participation (less than 1 percent and 3 percent respectively). These finding suggest policy design, such as phase-in periods, can be leveraged to minimize undesirable behavioral responses of households near retirement. Despite their potential detrimental effects in labor supply and savings, findings from a benefit-cost analysis suggest that the costs of undesired behavioral responses to an increase in contribution rates are orders of magnitude smaller than the revenue benefits to the NPS's finances.

大韩民国面临人口迅速老龄化，更依赖公共养老金支持，但养老金缴款不足以支持其长期义务。因此，关于对当前固定养老金制度进行何种类型的改革可以平衡该制度的长期供资与确保新老受益人的福利水平的争论越来越激烈。在本文中，我们开发并估计了一个动态行为模型，该模型捕捉了国民养老金计划 (NPS) 的基本要素以及劳动力供应、储蓄和福利方面的行为反应，使用具有全国代表性的已婚夫妇样本来应对公共养老金体系的变化。韩国老龄化纵向研究 (KLoSA) 中即将退休的夫妇。我们使用模型估计来评估反事实政策实验的影响，例如提高缴费率和延长正常退休年龄对接近退休的个人决定工作或不工作、储蓄和福利要求的影响。虽然这些政策旨在支持 NPS，但我们的模型表明，缴费率的变化可能会阻碍已婚家庭接近退休时的工作和储蓄。特别是，缴费率立即提高 2 个百分点，将使贫困家庭的家庭储蓄减少 2%，妻子的劳动参与率降低 3%，丈夫的劳动参与率降低不到 1%。当我们在五年内以偶数增量模拟相同的缴费率增长时，家庭预期政策变化并增加储蓄以弥补未来收入的下降，从而消除工作和储蓄减少等不良行为反应。相比之下，正常退休年龄每增加 2 年，家庭储蓄就会增加 3%，丈夫和妻子的劳动力参与率也会增加（分别低于 1% 和 3%）。这些发现表明，可以利用政策设计，例如逐步实施期，最大限度地减少临近退休家庭的不良行为反应。尽管它们对劳动力供应和储蓄有潜在的不利影响，