Time decisions of capacity investment are critical for start-up third party remanufacturers (3PR), especially when they are involved in downstream competition from their original equipment manufacturer (OEM). Considering a two-period model, we analyze 3PRs’ capacity investment timing issues by assuming their objective to be the maximization of the probability of survival. 3PRs may invest early to enjoy the first-mover advantage, or late to achieve coordination with the OEM and obtain the time value. In this paper, we first consider single 3PR setting and find that whether the 3PR invests early or late is affected by the fixed investment cost, the unit capacity cost and the recognition of the remanufactured products. However, in two competing 3PRs setting, there are three equilibriums: (1) One 3PR invests early, and the other invests late, that is, two symmetric 3PRs lead to an asymmetric equilibrium. (2) Both 3PRs invest early. (3) Both 3PRs invest late. Interestingly, we find that both 3PRs’ investing early may result in “Prisoner’s Dilemma”, although they can be better off by investing late simultaneously. Besides, we note that, the quantity of new products in the first period may limit the end-of-use (EOU) products which are collected for remanufacturing by the 3PRs. This motives the 3PR investing early sometimes takes first-mover the advantage to set a high capacity so as to force the other 3PR to leave the market.

产能投资的时间决定对于启动第三方再制造商（3PR）至关重要，尤其是当他们参与其原始设备制造商（OEM）的下游竞争时。考虑一个两阶段模型，我们通过假设3PR的目标是最大生存概率来分析其能力投资时机问题。3PR可能会进行早期投资以获得先发优势，或者后期进行投资以与OEM协调并获得时间价值。在本文中，我们首先考虑单一的3PR设置，并发现3PR的早期投资或晚期投资受固定投资成本，单位容量成本和再制造产品的确认的影响。但是，在两个相互竞争的3PR设置中，存在三个均衡：（1）一个3PR投资较早，而另一个3PR投资较晚，即，对称的3PR导致不对称的平衡。（2）两个3PR都投资较早。（3）两个3PR的​​投资都较晚。有趣的是，我们发现两个3PR的​​早期投资可能会导致“囚徒困境”，尽管同时进行后期投资可能会更好。此外，我们注意到，第一阶段的新产品数量可能会限制3PR收集的用于再制造的最终用途（EOU）产品。这激发了3PR早期投资有时会利用先行者的优势来设置高容量，从而迫使其他3PR退出市场。