This paper articulates and argues for the plausibility of the Presentation View of Perceptual Knowledge, an under-discussed epistemology of perception. On this view, a central epistemological role of perception is that of making subjects aware of their surroundings. By doing so, perception affords subjects with reasons for world-directed judgments. Moreover, the very perceived concrete entities are identified as those reasons. The former claim means that the position is a reasons-based epistemology; the latter means that it endorses a radically anti-psychologist conception of reasons. First, I articulate and motivate the Presentation View. Then, I defend the view from three incarnations of a major objection levelled within the ranks of reasons-based epistemologies: McDowell’s version of the accusation that a view like this falls prey to the Myth of the Given. I argue that all three incarnations fail to show the Presentation View to be inadequate. The first version holds that a general characterization of the Myth clearly shows that it is an incoherent idea. The second version holds that endorsing the Myth makes it impossible to construe non-conceptual items as items that can stand in rational relations to judgements and beliefs. The third version holds that endorsing the Myth leads to a conception where perceptual experiences merely cause, but do not warrant, our perceptual beliefs and judgements. I explain in detail how the Presentation View has the elements to respond to each of these objections.

本文明确阐述并论证了感知知识的表达观的合理性，这是一种未被充分讨论的认识论认识论。根据这种观点，感知的主要认识论作用是使主体意识到周围的环境。通过这样做，知觉使被试有理由进行世界范围的判断。此外，非常察觉具体的实体标识由于这些原因。先前的主张意味着该职位是基于原因的认识论。后者意味着它支持一种从根本上反心理学家的理性观念。首先，我阐明并激发演示文稿视图。然后，我从以理由为基础的认识论行列中对主要异议的三个化身捍卫了这一观点：麦克道威尔（McDowell）的指责是，这样的观点是“给定神话”的牺牲品。我认为这三个化身都不能证明“演讲观”是不充分的。第一个版本认为，神话的一般特征清楚地表明了它是一个不连贯的想法。第二个版本认为，支持神话使得不可能将非概念性项目解释为可以与判断和信念建立合理关系的项目。第三版认为，对神话的认可导致了这样一种观念，即知觉经验仅引起但不保证我们的知觉信念和判断。我将详细解释Presentation View如何具有响应这些反对意见的要素。