‘No-platforming’—the practice of denying someone the opportunity to express their opinion at certain venues because of the perceived abhorrent or misguided nature of their view(s)—is a hot topic. Several philosophers have advanced epistemic reasons for using the policy in certain cases. Here we introduce epistemic considerations against no-platforming that are relevant for the reflection on the cases at issue. We then contend that three recent epistemic arguments in favor of no-platforming fail to factor these considerations in and, as a result, offer neither a conclusive justification nor strong epistemic support for no-platforming in any of the relevant cases. Moreover, we argue that, taken together, our epistemic considerations against no-platforming and the three arguments for the policy suggest that no-platforming poses an epistemic dilemma (i.e., a difficult choice situation involving two equally undesirable options). While advocates and opponents of no-platforming alike have so far overlooked this dilemma, it should be addressed not only to prevent that actual no-platforming decisions create more epistemic harm than good, but also to put us into a better position to justify the policy when it is indeed warranted.

“无平台化”——由于人们认为他们的观点令人憎恶或被误导而拒绝某人在某些场所表达观点的机会——是一个热门话题。一些哲学家提出了在某些情况下使用该政策的认识论理由。在这里，我们介绍了与反思相关案例相关的非平台化的认知考虑。然后，我们争辩说，最近三个支持无平台化的认知论点未能将这些考虑因素考虑在内，因此，在任何相关案例中，既没有提供确凿的理由，也没有为无平台化提供强有力的认知支持。此外，我们认为，综合起来，我们反对无平台化的认知考虑和政策的三个论点表明，无平台化会造成认知困境（即，涉及两个同样不受欢迎的选择的困难选择情况）。虽然到目前为止，无平台化的拥护者和反对者都忽略了这一困境，但应该解决这个问题，不仅要防止实际的无平台化决策造成的认知弊大于利，还要让我们处于更好的位置来证明政策的合理性当确实有必要时。