According to the Norwegian philosopher Peter Wessel Zapffe (1899–1990), human life is filled with so much suffering that procreation is morally impermissible. In the first part of this paper I present Zapffe’s pessimism-based argument for anti-natalism, and contrast it with the arguments for anti-natalism proposed by Arthur Schopenhauer and David Benatar. In the second part I explore what Zapffe’s pessimism can teach us about biomedical enhancement. I make the (perhaps surprising) case that pessimism counts in favor of pursuing biomedical enhancements. The reason is that the worse we take the baseline human condition to be, the stronger are our reasons to try to alter humanity, and the weaker are our reasons to fear technology-driven extinction. The prospect of enhancement, I further argue, gives pessimists a reason to reject anti-natalism.

根据挪威哲学家彼得·韦塞尔·扎普夫（Peter Wessel Zapffe，1899–1990）的说法，人类生活充满了种种苦难，以至于生育在道德上是不允许的。在本文的第一部分中，我介绍了扎普夫基于悲观主义的反纳粹主义论据，并将其与亚瑟·叔本华和大卫·贝纳塔尔提出的反纳粹主义论证进行了对比。在第二部分中，我将探讨Zapffe的悲观主义可以教给我们有关生物医学增强的知识。我提出（也许令人惊讶）悲观主义有利于追求生物医学增强的案例。原因是我们认为人类的基本状况越差，我们改变人类的理由就越强，而我们担心技术驱动的灭绝的理由就越弱。我进一步认为，这种增强的前景使悲观主义者有理由拒绝反日分离主义。