In this paper I analyze philosophically the dominant conception of happiness operative in the increasingly popular global movement to empirically define, measure, and promote human happiness: the idea of “subjective psychological wellbeing” (SWB). SWB is presented as an ethically and metaphysically neutral “scientific” view of the human good or wellbeing, grounded purely in empirical psychology, survey data, and neuroscientific findings about the brain mechanisms involved in happiness. I argue that this conception of happiness actually rests upon highly controversial philosophical (non-empirical) presuppositions about the nature of human agency, pleasure, emotion, and the experience of value. I then draw upon phenomenology, the philosophy of emotion, and ethics to argue that this particular conception of happiness, while perhaps suitable for certain limited purposes, is highly problematic when given the leading normative role by the happiness science movement, particularly as a guiding aim of individual decision-making and public policy interventions.

在本文中，我从哲学上分析了在日益流行的全球运动中发挥作用的主要幸福概念，以经验地定义、衡量和促进人类幸福：“主观心理健康”（SWB）的概念。SWB 被呈现为一种伦理和形而上学中立的关于人类福祉的“科学”观点，纯粹基于经验心理学、调查数据和关于幸福所涉及的大脑机制的神经科学发现。我认为，这种幸福的概念实际上建立在关于人类能动性、快乐、情感和价值体验的性质的极具争议的哲学（非经验）预设之上。然后，我利用现象学、情感哲学和伦理学来论证这种特殊的幸福概念，