We analyze the problem of allocating indivisible objects and monetary compensations to a set of agents. In particular, we consider envy-free and budget-balanced rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. A key observation is that, for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via so-called agent--linked allocations. Given this observation, we provide an algorithm for identifying agent--linked allocations.

中文翻译：

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一种算法，用于识别不可分割经济体中最不可操纵的无嫉妒和预算平衡分配

我们分析了将不可分割的对象和货币补偿分配给一组代理的问题。特别是，我们考虑在代理人计数或效用收益方面最不易操纵的无嫉妒和预算平衡规则。一个关键的观察结果是，对于任何准线性偏好的配置文件，任何这种最不易操纵的无嫉妒规则的结果都可以通过所谓的代理关联分配获得。鉴于这一观察，我们提供了一种用于识别代理相关分配的算法。