We consider a bilateral delegation mixed duopoly with quantity setting, where the objective function of the public managers is based on strategic manipulation of a Generalized Welfare Function. We show that such manipulation, coupled with strategic delegation by the private firm, enables the government to enforce an efficient outcome at equilibrium. When the manipulation/delegation choices and their sequence are endogenized, public manipulation and private delegation are supported at equilibrium, with the government, as first mover, setting the weights of the Generalized Welfare Function at the most efficient level consistent with private firm retaining a manager. This ensures maximum welfare, as compared with all other organizational structures.

中文翻译：

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混合古诺双头垄断中双边代表团的效率

我们考虑双边委托混合双头垄断与数量设置，其中公共管理者的目标函数基于对广义福利函数的战略操纵。我们表明，这种操纵，加上私营公司的战略授权，使政府能够在均衡时执行有效的结果。当操纵/委托选择及其序列内生化时，公共操纵和私人委托得到均衡支持，政府作为先行者，将广义福利函数的权重设置在与私营公司保留经理一致的最有效水平. 与所有其他组织结构相比，这确保了最大的福利。