It’s intuitively plausible to suppose that there are many things that we can be rationally certain of, at least in many contexts. The present paper argues that, given this principle of Abundancy, there is a Preface Paradox for (rational) credence. Section 1 gives a statement of the paradox, discusses its relation to its familiar counterpart for (rational) belief, and points out the congeniality between Abundancy and broadly contextualist trends in epistemology. This leads to the question whether considerations of context-sensitivity might lend themselves to solving the Preface for credence. Sections 2 and 3 scrutinize two approaches in this spirit—one mimicking Hawthorne’s (2002) Semantic Contextualist approach to an epistemic version of the Preface, the other one analogous to Clarke’s (2015) Sensitivist approach to the doxastic version—arguing that neither approach succeeds as it stands.

至少在很多情况下，我们可以合理地确定许多事情，这在直观上是合理的。本文认为，鉴于这种丰富性原则，对于（理性）信任有一个序言悖论。第1节陈述了这一悖论，讨论了其与（理性）信仰的熟悉对应物之间的关系，并指出了丰富性与认识论的广义语境主义趋势之间的亲和性。这就引出了一个问题，即对上下文相关性的考虑是否可能有助于解决对序言的信任。第2节和第3节详细研究了本着这种精神的两种方法：一种是模仿霍桑（Hawthorne，2002年）的语义情境主义方法，来理解前言的认知版本，