In assessing tax decentralization optimality, a dilemma between efficiency and redistribution emerges: tax decentralization enhances fiscal discipline, but may also widen interregional disparities by triggering tax competition over mobile tax bases. We present a model that formalizes this trade-off, and find that tax decentralization can be optimal even under Rawlsian social preferences which only weight the welfare of the poorest region in the economy. We also revisit the empirical relationship between tax decentralization and regional disparities. Our estimates uncover a hump-shaped profile, which can be compatible with our normative prescriptions when social aversion for interregional inequality is low.

在评估税收分权的最优性时，效率和再分配之间出现了两难选择：税收分权提高了财政纪律，但也可能引发跨移动税基的税收竞争，从而扩大了地区间的差距。我们提出了一种形式化这一权衡取舍的模型，发现即使在罗尔斯的社会偏好下，税收分权也可以是最优的，而后者仅权衡了经济中最贫困地区的福利。我们还回顾了税收分权与区域差异之间的经验关系。我们的估计揭示了一个驼峰形的轮廓，当对区域间不平等的社会厌恶情绪较低时，这可以与我们的规范性规定相吻合。