In many countries, jobseekers are entitled to unemployment benefits (UBs) only if they have previously worked a minimum period of time. This institutional feature creates a sharp change in the disutility from unemployment at UB eligibility and may distort the duration of jobs. In this paper, we evaluate this eligibility effect using a regression discontinuity approach. Our evidence is based on longitudinal social security data from Portugal, where jobseekers are required to work a relatively long period to collect UBs. We find that monthly transitions from employment to unemployment increase by 10% as soon as the eligibility condition is met. This result is driven entirely by transitions to subsidised unemployment, which increase by 20%, as non-subsidised unemployment is not affected. The effects are even larger for the unemployed with high UB replacement ratios or those who meet the eligibility condition from multiple short employment spells. These transitions deserve greater attention from UB agencies and public employment services.

在许多国家，求职者只有在之前工作过最短时间的情况下才有资格获得失业救济金 (UBs)。这种制度特征使 UB 资格失业的不利影响发生了急剧变化，并可能扭曲工作的持续时间。在本文中，我们使用回归不连续性方法评估这种资格效应。我们的证据基于葡萄牙的纵向社会保障数据，要求求职者工作相对较长的时间来收集 UB。我们发现，一旦满足资格条件，从就业到失业的每月过渡就会增加 10%。这一结果完全是由向有补贴的失业过渡推动的，后者增加了 20%，因为非补贴失业不受影响。对于 UB 替代率高的失业者或因多次短期就业而符合资格条件的失业者，影响甚至更大。这些转变值得 UB 机构和公共就业服务机构给予更多关注。