This paper examines the relation between state contract law and the use of accounting information in debt contracts. Contract theory suggests that balance sheet based covenants resolve debtholder-shareholder conflicts ex ante, whereas income statement based covenants serve as trip- wires that trigger the switch of control rights ex post. It is more difficult for lenders to exert their control rights ex post if the contract law is more favorable to debtors (i.e., the law is pro-debtor), suggesting that balance sheet based covenants are more efficient in these jurisdictions. We therefore test and find evidence that lenders using pro-debtor (pro-lender) law are more (less) likely to rely on balance sheet based covenants. We measure reliance using both the weight of balance sheet covenants relative to income statement covenants and the covenant strictness. Our analysis further shows that contracts with performance pricing grids are less likely to include interest increasing grids when the law is more favorable to debtors. The results provide initial evidence that contract law is an important determinant for the design of debt contracts.

本文研究了国家合同法与债务合同中会计信息的使用之间的关系。合同理论表明，基于资产负债表的契约可以事前解决债务人与股东之间的冲突，而基于损益表的契约则是触发事后控制权转换的绊脚石。如果合同法更有利于债务人（即法律是有利于债务人的债务人），则放贷人更难事后行使控制权，这表明基于资产负债表的盟约在这些司法管辖区更为有效。因此，我们测试并发现证据表明，使用赞成债务人（赞成贷款人）法的贷方更有可能（更少）依赖基于资产负债表的契约。我们使用资产负债表契约相对于损益表契约的权重和契约严格性来衡量信赖度。我们的分析进一步表明，当法律更有利于债务人时，具有绩效定价网格的合同不太可能包含加息网格。结果为合同法是债务合同设计的重要决定因素提供了初步证据。