This paper characterizes mechanisms satisfying incentive compatibility and individual rationality in the classical public good provision problem. Many papers in the literature obtain the results in the so-called standard model of ex ante identical agents with a continuous, closed interval of types. The main contribution of this paper is the characterization of the budget-surplus maximizing mechanism satisfying incentive compatibility and individual rationality (Theorem 1 for Bayesian implementation and Theorem 3 for dominant strategy implementation) that applies to a finite discretization over the standard model. Making use of the proposed budget-surplus maximizing mechanisms, we show that some known results do not need the agents’ risk neutrality, whereas some others do rely on the agents’ risk neutrality in a subtle manner. Furthermore, we improve upon some known results and obtain new results which do not exist in the standard model.

本文描述了在经典公共物品供给问题中满足激励相容性和个人理性的机制。文献中的许多论文都是在具有连续，封闭类型间隔的事前相同代理人的所谓标准模型中获得结果的。本文的主要贡献是描述了满足激励相容性和个人理性的预算盈余最大化机制（贝叶斯实施定理1和主导策略实施定理3）的特征，该机制适用于标准模型的有限离散化。利用提议的预算盈余最大化机制，我们表明，某些已知结果不需要代理人的风险中性，而另一些确实需要代理人的风险中性以微妙的方式。此外，